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Fortune v. First Union National Bank: Abandoning Theory
for Just Results
Treatises on trusts clearly state that when a trust suffers losses due to the
trustee's mismanagement, a beneficiary with a speculative future interest cannot
bring an action at law against the trustee for present, individual recovery of
funds that may be due to him at some future time under the terms of the trust.1
The appropriate remedy is compelling the trustee, in equity, to restore any losses
to the trust, so that the beneficiary may enjoy the benefit of those funds at the
time and to the extent dictated by the terms of the trust instrument.2 This equi-
table remedy allows the trust to be carried out according to the settlor's intent as
stated in the trust instrument and protects the trust for beneficiaries with future
interests, ensuring that those beneficiaries will receive what would have been
theirs absent any mismanagement. In short, the equitable remedy restores the
status quo, and the trust resumes as if a breach never had occurred.3
In Fortune v. First Union National Bank 4 the Supreme Court of North Car-
olina, however, chose not to apply the usual equitable remedy of restoration of
funds to a trust. The Fortune court prematurely terminated a testamentary trust
and awarded damages directly to a contingent remainderman for losses resulting
from a breach of fiduciary duty by the executor of the estate. This unusual
remedy, in violation of accepted tenets of trust law, left the trusts created by the
testator unfunded, so that alternative beneficiaries entitled to the entire remain-
der under certain circumstances instead would receive nothing at all. Both the
supreme court and the lower courts failed to appoint a guardian ad litem for the
issue of the remainderman who would take in the event the remainderman failed
to survive his mother, a life income beneficiary. The court, consequently, termi-
nated the trust without considering the interests of unborn parties who conceiva-
bly could have received the entirety of the trust.5
This Note criticizes the Fortune decision for its failure to follow a well-
settled principle of trust law by prematurely terminating a trust without the
consent of all possible beneficiaries and for its failure to appoint a guardian ad
litem to protect the interests of unborn beneficiaries. It also examines previous
case law and searches for a rationale behind the Fortune opinion. This Note
concludes that perhaps the difficult fact situation explains the court's distorted
application of the law. Finally, this Note contemplates the possible effects of
this decision.




4. 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988).
5. See id. The only mention of appointing a guardian ad litem appeared in the defendant's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court denied the motion and did not
appoint a guardian. Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Record at 83-
86, Fortune, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988) (No. 552PA87).
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In 1977 Robert Fortune died unexpectedly, survived by his wife Betty and
young son Dale. 6 The major asset of his estate was all the outstanding stock of
Royal Dodge, Inc., a car dealership that he had owned and operated. His will
provided that, after certain gifts of personal property and payment of his debts,
the residuary of the estate passed into two trusts: a marital deduction trust for
the-benefit of his wife Betty and a family trust funded with any property remain-
ing after funding of the marital deduction trust.7
The -family trust instrument provided that during Betty Fortune's life the
trustee could, in its absolute discretion, distribute income or principal from the
family trust to Betty, their son Dale, or Dale's issue.8 On Betty Fortune's death,
the remainder, if any, was to pass to Dale, but if Dale predeceased Mrs. Fortune,
then the remainder was to pass to Dale's issue.9
The will named the defendant First Union National Bank as executor of the
6. Plaintiff Appellee's New Brief at 2, Fortune, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988) (No.
552PA87). Dale was 10 years old at the time of his father's death, and he was 18 by the time this
case reached the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id.
7. Id. The marital deduction trust is an estate planning device that takes advantage of the
marital deduction allowed upon transfer of property from one spouse to another under the federal
gift tax. See I.R.C. § 2056 (1986). In large estates, $600,000 of property may be transferred outside
the marital deduction trust to capitalize on the $600,000 exemption from estate and gift tax. The
rest of the estate may be used to fund the marital deduction trust. This arrangement takes full
advantage of the $600,000 exemption upon the death of each spouse. See J. DUKEMINIER & S.
JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 1038-40 (3d ed. 1984).
8. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 148, 371 S.E.2d at 484.
9. Id. The Fortunes argued that Dale's interest was a vested remainder subject to complete
divestment in the event Dale failed to survive his mother. Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 9 n.5.
For a complete discussion of the nature of this type of interest, see T. BERGIN & P. HASKELL,
PREFACE TO ESTATES IN LAND AND FUTURE INTERESTS 62-80 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter BERGIN
& HASKELL]. The difference between a contingent remainder and a vested remainder often depends
merely on the word order in the trust instrument. For example, when the instrument provides an
interest to A for life, then to B and his heirs, but if B does not survive A, then to C and his heirs, B
has a vested remainder subject to complete divestment, and C has an executory interest. The survi-
vorship requirement in this example is a condition subsequent that operates to divest the vested
interest. In contrast, if the instrument leaves property to A for life, then ifB survives A to B and his
heirs, otherwise to C, B and C have alternative contingent remainders. The conditional language
preceding the creation of B's remainder interest makes the condition a condition precedent. As a
result, B's interest is not vested. Id. at 71-73.
The Fortune family trust provided "after the death of my wife ... [the trust corpus] shall be
delivered and conveyed to my son [Dale], or if he should be deceased to his living issue per stirpes."
Record at 17 (Robert Fortune's will). The wording of this provision suggests Mr. Fortune intended
either a contingent or vested remainder for Dale. The plaintiff argued Dale's interest was vested, but
the supreme court never defined specifically Dale's interest in terms of a vested or contingent inter-
est. The court merely referred to the certainty or uncertainty of the amount owed to Dale. Fortune,
323 N.C. at 150-51, 371 S.E.2d at 485-86. Because of the firmly established constructional prefer-
ence for vested interests, most courts probably would denominate Dale's interest as a vested remain-
der subject to complete divestment. See Bush v. Hamill, 273 Ill. 132, 112 N.E. 375 (1916); Hersey v.
Purington, 96 Me. 166, 51 A. 865 (1902); explanation and cases cited in Annotation, First National
Bank of Cincinnati v. Virginia Tenney, 61 A.L.R.2D 470, 475 (1958); BERGIN & HASKELL, supra, at
134. The difference between the contingent remainder and the vested remainder subject to complete
divestment is of little significance today (except for purposes of the rule against perpetuities). Thus,
the determination of the correct terminology for the interest is not absolutely necessary. BERGIN &
HASKELL, supra, at 135. It is only necessary that the uncertain nature of the remainderman's inter-
est be understood. Clearly, Dale did not have the sole beneficial interest in the funds. When the
settlor's intention appears to have been "that the beneficiary should take the principal only if he
should live until the expiration of the period, he has not the whole beneficial interest in the trust
property." 2 ScoTt, supra note I, § 128.2.
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will and trustee of both trusts.10 Despite offers to buy the car dealership, the
Bank retained the dealership, which suffered a significant decline in value before
it was finally sold." The Bank received a time extension on administration of
the estate and finally sold the dealership at a great loss, with payments to be
made in installments. 12 The estate still was not closed at time of trial, and the
trusts were funded with only one dollar each. 13
The Fortunes sued First Union for a breach of its fiduciary duty as execu-
tor.1 4 Though Mrs. Fortune's claim was barred because the statute of limita-
tions had run, Dale succeeded in his claim for damages. 15 At trial the jury
found that First Union had breached its fiduciary duty as executor. Based on
evidence that First Union had retained the dealership knowing that much of its
success was based on Mr. Fortune's management, the jury concluded that the
bank as executor should have sold it as soon as possible after Mr. Fortune's
death. The jury awarded damages to Dale Fortune individually in the amount
of $413,744.76.16 This amount was based on a theory that Dale was entitled to
one half of the total damages to the trust as a "joint beneficiary." 17
The court of appeals accepted First Union's argument that the award of
damages individually to Dale was erroneous because the losses due to First
Union's breach as executor were owed to the trusts, rather than to Dale.18 The
court of appeals affirmed the ruling on liability against First Union, but re-
manded with respect to remedy. Stating that the amount Dale would receive
from the trust was speculative, the court of appeals concluded that this uncer-
tainty regarding the amount of damages precluded an award to Dale individu-
ally. The court of appeals held that a plaintiff whose benefit under the trust is
merely speculative is entitled only to the equitable remedy of restoration of the
money lost to the trust so that the plaintiff is in the same position as he was
before the breach. The court of appeals, however, incorrectly calculated the
10. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 147-48, 371 S.E.2d at 484.
11. Fortune v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 87 N.C. App. 1, 4, 359 S.E.2d 801, 803 (1987), rev'd,
323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988). The dealership suffered losses of nearly $400,000 during the
time it was managed by First Union. Id.
12. Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 2-3. At the time of the litigation First Union still had
failed to collect any payments. Id. at 4.
13. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 148, 371 S.E.2d at 484.
14. Id. at 147, 371 S.E.2d at 484. An executor who breaches his fiduciary duty in the adminis-
tration of an estate is liable for damages resulting from the breach to the same extent and in the same
way as a trustee of an express trust. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-13-10(c) (1984); RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TRUSTS § 6 comment b (1959); 1 SCOTT, supra note 1, § 6.
15. Fortune, 87 N.C. App. at 4, 359 S.E.2d at 804. The trial court applied the three-year statute
of limitations for actions for breach of contract and dismissed Mrs. Fortune's claim on the ground
that Mrs. Fortune had known of the trustee's mismanagement for some time and had failed to take
any action within the three-year statute of limitations. Plaintiff-Appellee's New Brief at 6; Defend-
ant-Appellant's New Brief at 4, Fortune, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988) (No. 552PA87).
Dale's action was not dismissed, because the statute had been tolled during his minority. Fortune, 87
N.C. App. at 6-7, 359 S.E.2d at 805.
16. Fortune, 87 N.C. App. at 4-6, 359 S.E.2d at 804-05.
17. Id. at 7, 359 S.E.2d at 805. Having concluded that Mrs. Fortune had no right to recovery,
the trial court categorized Dale's interest as a one-half interest in the family trust and awarded Dale
one half the amount that the evidence indicated was lost due to the defendant's breach. Id. at 9-10,
359 S.E.2d at 807.
18. Id. at 7-9, 359 S.E.2d at 806-07.
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amount to be restored to the trust. The court merely shifted the jury award,
calculated on the basis of individual damages, from Dale back to the trust. 19
The North Carolina Supreme Court reinstated the trial court's decision and
held that Dale was entitled to bring the action in his individual capacity. 20
Thus, the court awarded damages directly to Dale, rather than applying the
equitable remedy of restoring funds to the trust. The Fortune majority, in an
opinion authored by Justice Webb, found that the court of appeals decision did
not hold that an individual cannot recover, but simply that Dale could not be-
cause his interest was too speculative. 2 1 The court then disagreed with the court
of appeals, concluding that Dale's damages could be proved with sufficient cer-
tainty. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on a number of factors. It
looked at the amount that could have been put into the trusts if not for the
breach, it concluded that because of Betty Fortune's interest in the marital de-
duction trust there would never be a need for the trustee to distribute to her out
of the family trust,22 and it relied on mortuary tables to calculate the value of
Dale's remainder interest. 23
Although it reinstated the trial court's decision to allow Dale to recover
individually, the supreme court held that the trial court incorrectly calculated
Dale's individual damages on the theory that he had a one-half interest in the
family trust.24 The court recognized that he did not have a one-half interest in
the trust, but that his recovery should reflect the fact he had only a remainder,
an interest that could result in his getting all or nothing as circumstances devel-
oped. Thus, the court ordered a new trial to determine the amount of individual
damage to Dale only.2 5
Justice Meyer's strong dissent argued that the remedy should be restoration
19. Id. Justice Meyer pointed out in his dissent the error in entering a judgment in favor of the
trust when the case was neither argued nor defended on the basis of liability to the trust. According
to Justice Meyer, although the court of appeals came much closer to the correct remedy than either
the trial court or the supreme court, it did not have the authority simply to shift the theory of
liability without giving the parties an opportunity to argue and defend based on that theory of liabil-
ity. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 152, 371 S.E.2d at 486 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
20. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 149-50, 371 S.E.2d at 485.
21. Id.
22. Mrs. Fortune's interest in the family trust raised a further complication hindering the rem-
edy of restoration of funds to the trust. Summary judgment was granted against Betty Fortune's
claim for individual damages on the grounds that the statute of limitations had run, Plaintiff-Appel-
lee's New Brief at 6, whereas Dale's claim was allowed only because the court found the three-year
statutory period was tolled during his minority. Fortune, 87 N.C. App. at 4, 359 S.E.2d at 804.
Based on the theory that Mrs. Fortune no longer had any right to recover for loss to the trusts,
confusion might arise as to her right to benefit from the trust as the named life beneficiary if Dale's
remedy consisted of restoring lost funds to the trust. The dissenting opinion in the supreme court
decision correctly pointed out that if the court appointed a substitute trustee and restored the losses
to the trusts as a remedy, Mrs. Fortune would not be barred from receiving benefits under those
trusts. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 158, 371 S.E.2d at 490 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
23. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 150-51, 371 S.E.2d at 485. The majority's argument that the amount
of Dale's interest could be computed easily with mortuary tables was countered effectively by the
dissent's suggestion of many contingencies, including the possibility Dale would never receive any-
thing, making the present value of his interest very speculative. Compare Fortune, 323 N.C. at 150-
51, 371 S.E.2d at 485-86 with Fortune, 323 N.C. at 156-57, 371 S.E.2d at 489 (Meyer, J. dissenting).
24. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 151, 371 S.E.2d at 486.
25. Id.
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of damages to the trust, a remedy that treatises uniformly state is the proper one
on these facts.2 6 The dissenting opinion observed that the court of appeals erred
in allowing the amount of the jury verdict to stand when it awarded recovery to
the trust rather than to Dale. Because the case was argued at trial based on a
theory of individual recovery, Justice Meyer stated that it was incorrect for the
court of appeals simply to shift the jury award to the trust.27 Hence, the dissent-
ers agreed that the case should be resubmitted to the jury for recalculation of
damages.
The dissenting opinion, however, argued that the court of appeals correctly
held that Dale should not recover individual damages. The dissent argued that
Dale had a mere speculative interest while his mother lived so he should not
receive the corpus of the trust before her death. These justices argued that the
remedy should instead be to restore the loss to the trust so that Dale could
receive his share, if and when circumstances arose such that he was the proper
recipient. 28 The dissenters listed several factors supporting the argument that
damages to Dale were too speculative to be determined and argued that, even if
he were the proper party to sue, the uncertainty of damages would preclude his
recovery. These factors included the following: Dale's income interest rested in
the uncontrolled discretion of the trustee; the amount of distributions to Mrs.
Fortune remained uncertain;29 Dale could fail to survive his mother, and the
remainder could pass to his issue without his ever receiving anything under the
trust.30
Arguing in favor of restoration to the trust, the dissenting opinion recog-
nized the need for a substitute trustee to effectuate this remedy. 31 The dissenters
stated that a clear conflict of interest existed between First Union in its role as
the executor who committed a breach of duty in estate administration and First
Union as trustee with a duty to sue the executor for losses due to the breach on
behalf of the beneficiaries. 32 For the trust to recover funds without appointment
of a substitute trustee, First Union in its role as trustee would have to seek re-
covery from itself as executor. Thus, the dissent observed that a substitute
26. Id. at 152-55, 371 S.E.2d at 486-88 (Meyer, J., dissenting, joined by Exun, C.J. and Which-
ard, J.). See 3 ScoTr, supra note 1, §§ 197-98; G. BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS § 157 (5th ed. 1973);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198 comment c (1959) (all consistent with the dissenting
opinion in Fortune).
27. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 152, 371 S.E.2d at 486 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 154-57, 371 S.E.2d at 487-89 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
29. The dissenting opinion suggested that a long-term illness or accident could have occurred
requiring expensive medical care for her that might have led to depletion of both trusts for her needs.
Id. at 156-57, 371 S.E.2d at 489 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
30. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 157, 371 S.E.2d at 489 (Meyer, J., dissenting).
32. Id. (Meyer, J., dissenting). The trustee's fiduciary duty requires the trustee to ensure that
the trust receives all the assets owed to it. When the executor does not deliver all the assets to the
trust, the trustee's duty may include bringing suit against the executor to recover assets that should
have been delivered to the trust. A conflict develops if the same entity serves as both executor and
trustee, because the trustee then has a duty to bring suit against itself in the role of executor. See In
re First Nat'I Bank of Mansfield, 37 Ohio St. 2d 60, 307 N.E.2d 23 (1974) (bank in its role as trustee
held liable to beneficiaries for not taking action to recover trust funds lost by bank in its role as
executor due to a breach of trust).
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trustee was clearly necessary to apply the remedy of restoration of funds to the
trust. The dissent argued that this is the preferable remedy because it would
further the testator's intent for distribution of funds and it would ensure fair
distribution of funds in accordance with the terms of the trust. Furthermore,
restoring losses to the trust with a new trustee in place more adequately would
compensate the family as a whole. Damages to the trust probably would exceed
Dale's individual award, and Betty Fortune would have the opportunity to share
in any funds restored to the trusts. 33
Restoration of funds to the trust, however, would not guarantee any imme-
diate payments to Dale or Mrs. Fortune. 34 Until Mrs. Fortune's death, they
would only be entitled to receive what the trustee, in his absolute discretion,
chose to distribute to them. The Fortunes apparently preferred receiving funds
immediately, regardless of whether the trust could recover a larger amount. The
choice to seek individual damages perhaps was a result of having already suf-
fered losses and economic hardship at the hands of First Union, the present
trustee. These sympathetic circumstances also probably led to the court's deci-
sion to award damages directly to Dale as he requested.
Numerous North Carolina cases and the leading treatises have differed
from the Fortune holding and have established that a trust beneficiary should
not recover damages for a breach of trust unless the trustee owes him a sum
certain at the present time.35 When the beneficiary's interest is uncertain, his
remedy should be an equitable one to have the loss restored to the trust. 36 An
award of damages when no payments are due to the beneficiary constitutes a
premature termination of the trust. Termination generally is not permitted
before all the beneficiaries are known, because premature termination may result
in a distribution quite different from the distribution that would result in the
absence of a breach of trust.37
33. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 158-59, 371 S.E.2d at 489-90 (Meyer, J., dissenting). Although Betty
Fortune might have been precluded from bringing an individual action because the statute of limita-
tions had run, there was nothing to prevent her from sharing in the trust as a beneficiary if funds
were restored to the trust in a suit brought by either another beneficiary or a new trustee. Id. at 158,
371 S.E.2d at 489-90 (Meyer, J., dissenting) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 176
(1959)). Because the court based the amount of Dale's individual award on the portion of trust
funds he was likely to receive, a remedy restoring the total loss to the trusts probably would have
forced First Union to pay a greater sum. See Fortune, 323 N.C. at 158-59, 371 S.E.2d at 490 (Meyer,
J., dissenting).
34. Betty and Dale would not be guaranteed any immediate payment if the funds were restored
to the family trust because the distribution during Betty's life was in the trustee's absolute discretion.
Fortune, 323 N.C. at 147, 371 S.E.2d at 484. An absolute discretionary trust is one in which the
trustee has complete discretion to determine whether to pay trust income or principal to the benefi-
ciaries, and in what amount. Lineback v. Stout, 79 N.C. App. 292, 296, 339 S.E.2d 103, 106 (1986).
The trustee may, in its discretion, choose to withhold the trust income and principal altogether from
the beneficiaries during the life of the trust. Id.
35. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (1959); G. BOGERT, supra note
26, § 157; 3 SCOTT, supra note I, §§ 197-98. See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text for discus-
sion of North Carolina cases.
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (1959); G. BOGERT, supra note 26,
§ 157; 3 SCOTT, supra note I, §§ 197-98.
37. See Freeman v. Cook, 41 N.C. (6 Ired. Eq.) 373, 379 (1849) (per curiam) (stating that in
giving relief for a breach of trust, a court should always endeavor to return the parties to the situa-
tion they would have been in if no breach had taken place).
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Over a century ago in Dick v. Pitchford3M the North Carolina Supreme
Court established that premature termination of a trust is improper when all the
interests are not yet certain and money is not yet due to the beneficiary. 39 In
Dick the testator left property in trust and directed the trustee to distribute the
income to the testator's son for his life, with the remainder passing to any of the
testator's three grandsons living at his son's death and to the issue of any grand-
son not then living.4° Because the income beneficiary was deeply in debt, he
sought to have the trusts terminated immediately and the trust property distrib-
uted to him. The court, however, concluded that the living beneficiaries were
not entitled to disbursement from the trustee. The court stated that the income
beneficiary was entitled to no more than current profits, and even if the grand-
sons concurred with their father in demanding termination of the trust, prema-
ture termination should not be granted.4 1 The court recognized that the trust
created valuable contingent interests in the great-grandchildren of the settlor
and the purpose of the trust included protecting those interests as well as the
interests of the beneficiaries then living.42 The court stated that it is the duty of
the trustee and the court to protect the settlor's intended distribution of prop-
erty, including contingent interests.4 3
Similarly, in Battle v. Petway" the court held that a trust beneficiary is "not
entitled to call for the legal estate when, from the nature of the trust, his owner-
ship is not immediate and absolute, and when it would defeat or put it in his
power to defeat or endanger a legitimate ulterior limitation of the trust."' 45 In
Battle the trust provided for payment of income to a life beneficiary followed by
a remainder interest.4 6 The court held that equity clearly would not allow the
trustee to convey the principal to the life beneficiary, but would require the
trustee to hold the principal for the remainderman. 47 Indeed, the court stated
that while there was any contingent interest in the trust property, the trustee had
to retain the property, and the court of equity would not order the trustee to
transfer the legal title.48
38. 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) 480 (1837).
39. See id. at 486-87. North Carolina courts have recognized that a beneficiary is entitled to
immediate damages where there is a dry trust and the settlor intended a sole beneficiary. Riddle v.
Riddle, 58 N.C. App. 594, 596, 293 S.E.2d 819, 821 (1982). A dry trust, or passive trust, is defined
as one in which the trustee no longer has any active duties to perform. P. HASKELL, PREFACE TO
WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ADMINISTRATION 85 (1987). Thus, whether the settlor intends funds to be
immediately and absolutely due to a certain beneficiary determines whether the beneficiary may
recover individual damages for a breach of trust.
40. Dick, 21 N.C. (1 Dev. & Bat. Eq.) at 481.
41. Id. at 486.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. 27 N.C. (5 Ired.) 576 (1845).
45. Id. at 578.
46. Id. at 576.
47. Id. at 578-79.
48. Id.; see also Jenkins v. Lambeth, 172 N.C. 466, 469-79, 90 S.E. 513, 514-15 (1916) (holding
that when a trust provides for life estate and contingent remaindermen, beneficiaries cannot seek
distribution of property until true owners can be determined properly in accordance with the terms
of the trust); Cameron v. Hicks, 141 N.C. 21, 30, 53 S.E. 728, 732 (1906) (holding that "where an
estate is conveyed to trustees to preserve contingent remainders ... legal title must remain in the
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The North Carolina Supreme Court emphasized the importance of carrying
out the trust in accordance with the settlor's intent when it again refused to
terminate a trust prematurely in Penick v. Bank of Wadesboro.49 In Penick a
charitable trust provided for the beneficiary to receive the principal at the end of
ninety-nine years. Until that time all income was to be accumulated and noth-
ing distributed to the beneficiary. In refusing to terminate the trust prematurely,
the court acknowledged its duty to protect the testator's purpose except in cases
of emergency or to preserve the trust property.50 Applied to the facts of For-
tune, Penick indicates that even if there were not contingencies affecting Dale's
interest, the court should have respected the time and manner of distribution
that Mr. Fortune sought to achieve by setting up the family trust.
Consistent with these North Carolina cases, the Restatement of Trusts
clearly states that, in general, the remedies of a beneficiary against a trustee are
exclusively equitable.51 The beneficiary, therefore, has no cause of action for
damages and can merely seek to be restored to the position he was in before the
trustee's breach.5 2 Thus, under the Restatement view, Dale's claim should have
been a suit in equity to compel First Union to restore the lost funds to the
trust.53 The beneficiary's remedy suggested by the Restatement also has been
followed consistently by the leading treatises in the field.54 Thus, formulations
trustee" because the uncertainty of whom the beneficiaries are would make it impossible for anyone
to call for legal title); Gillis v. McKay, 15 N.C. (4 Dev.) 172, 174 (1833) (stating that "it]he principle
is, that the legal estate is not to be transferred or divested out of the trustee, unless that may be done
without affecting any rightful purpose for which that estate was created").
49. 218 N.C. 686, 690, 12 S.E.2d 253, 257 (1940).
50. Id. at 690-91, 12 S.E.2d at 257.
51. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 197 (1959).
52. Id. § 198 comment c. "If the trustee is not under a duty to pay money immediately and
unconditionally to the beneficiary, the beneficiary cannot maintain an action at law against him."
Id. Section 198 of the Restatement provides that the beneficiary may recover damages directly from
the trustee only when the trustee is under an unconditional duty to pay the beneficiary immediately
and fails to do so in breach of trust. First Union's breach of trust did not fit this exception because
First Union had no duty to distribute funds to Dale until his mother's death, and even then Dale's
taking was contingent on surviving his mother.
53. See id. § 198. The Fortune court apparently either misunderstood section 198 of the Re-
statement or chose to ignore it. The court correctly noted that illustration d of Section 198 indicates
that "the beneficiary's remedy in such a case is a suit in equity to compel the trustee to restore the
money." Fortune, 323 N.C. at 149, 371 S.E.2d at 485 (1988). The court did not, however, further
address the Restatement view. The court then cited several cases factually quite different from For-
tune for the proposition that a beneficiary may recover damages from an executor or trustee, and
summarily concluded: "We see no reason why a beneficiary may not sue an executor or trustee for
damages if the executor or trustee has mismanaged the property he holds in a fiduciary capacity ....
We hold that such a claim may be maintained." Id. A discussion of the cases cited in support of
awarding damages to the beneficiary follows infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
54. See 3 SCOTT, supra note 1, §§ 197-98; G. BOGERT, supra note 26, § 157. Furthermore,
numerous cases in other jurisdictions also support the view that it is erroneous to terminate prema-
turely a trust and allow a contingent beneficiary to recover the trust's losses. For example, a Massa-
chusetts court clearly stated the law regarding a trust beneficiary's remedies as follows:
It is well settled that a [trust beneficiary] cannot bring an action at law against a
trustee to recover for money had and received while the trust is still open; but when the
trust has been closed and settled, the amount due the [beneficiary) established and made
certain, and nothing remains to be done but to pay over money, such an action may be
maintained.
Johnson v. Johnson, 120 Mass. 465, 466 (1875).
More recently, the Supreme Court of Colorado also discussed when a beneficiary may bring an
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of black-letter law and prior North Carolina cases conflict'with the holding in
Fortune.55
Another procedure or remedy that is firmly established in North Carolina
and throughout the United States provides that a trust may be terminated pre-
maturely when all the beneficiaries and the trustee agree to termination.5 6
When there are unborn or unascertained contingent beneficiaries as in Fortune,
however, all of the beneficiaries are not able to consent to termination. Under
these circumstances, termination of the trust is viewed as improper.5 7 The court
generally will appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries in a suit for termination. The guardian may approve
a termination or modification of the trust on behalf of the unborn beneficiaries.5 8
Courts, however, usually will not permit termination of the trust despite consent
by a guardian ad litem if it would defeat the settlor's intention in creating the
trust. 59 In Fortune no guardian ever was appointed to represent the contingent
interests in Dale's issue.6
°
Despite the clarity of the treatises in this area and the number of cases
action at law against a trustee for breach of trust in Kaitz v. District Court, 650 P.2d 553 (Colo.
1982). The court cited the Restatement in stating that an action by a beneficiary against a trustee in
an existing trust is generally, but not always, equitable in nature. Id. at 555 (citing RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 197-98 (1959)). The Kaitz court noted that only when money is immedi-
ately and unconditionally owed to the beneficiary may a beneficiary bring an action at law. The
court concluded that because there was no failure to pay a sum certain owed to the beneficiaries, the
general rule that an action by a beneficiary is equitable in nature applied. Id.
55. See 3 SCOTT, supra note 1, §§ 197-98; G. BOGERT, supra note .26, § 157. Scott, in his
treatise on trusts, states, "modern courts have not permitted the beneficiary of a trust to maintain an
action at law for tort against the trustee for breach of trust." 3 ScoTr, supra note 1, § 197.1. He
further states that the rule limiting a trust beneficiary to equitable remedies has been relaxed in cases
where nothing remains to be done by the trustee but to transfer and deliver the property to the
beneficiary. Scott gives no indication, however, of any exception to the rule that the beneficiary's
remedy is equitable when a sum certain is not yet owed to the beneficiary.
56. See Solon Lodge v. Ionic Lodge, 247 N.C. 310, 101 S.E.2d 8 (1957); Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. Laws, 217 N.C. 171, 7 S.E.2d 470 (1940); Fisher v. Ladd, 47 N.C. App. 587, 268 S.E.2d
20 (1980); P. HASKELL, supra note 39, at 223. If there is no material purpose involved in the trust,
all the beneficiaries, even without the trustee's consent, may be able to terminate the trust. A mate-
rial purpose is defined as a purpose other than mere successive enjoyment and may include purposes
such as insuring the beneficiary has ongoing income or protecting a beneficiary who is not capable of
handling the money. P. HASKELL, supra note 39, at 223-27.
57. Starling v. Taylor, 1 N.C. App. 287, 161 S.E.2d 204 (1968); R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA
LAW OF TRUSTS § 33f (6th ed. 1977); 4 SCOTT, supra note 1, § 340.
58. 4 SCOTT, supra note 1, § 340; see In re Flexner's Trust, 56 Misc. 2d 336, 288 N.Y.S.2d 494,
aff'd without opinion, 30 A.D.2d 1049, 294 N.Y.S.2d 669 (1968). In Flexner a woman created an
inter vivos trust for herself, her daughter, and then her grandchildren. The daughter died leaving
the settlor to support the grandchildren. The Flexner court held that, with the consent of the guard-
ian ad litem, the settlor could revoke the trust in part and give part of the money to her grandchil-
dren. Id. at 336-37, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 495. Thus, revocation was allowed because the interests of the
minor beneficiaries were represented, and they received compensation for their potential loss.
59. 4 SCOTT, supra note 1, § 340; see, e.g., Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Co. v. Smith, 97 R.I. 480,
198 A.2d 664 (1964).
60. See Fortune, 323 N.C. 146, 371 S.E.2d 483 (1988). In First Union's motion for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict, the bank pointed out that potential ultimate beneficiaries were not rep-
resented in the action by a guardian ad litem. Defendant's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding
the Verdict, Record at 83-85. First Union argued that without representation of all beneficiaries,
Dale could sue only for the benefit of the trust. The trial court, however, denied the motion for
judgment notwithstanding the verdict, and neither the court of appeals nor the supreme court ad-
dressed the failure to appoint a guardian. It appears that the courts completely failed to recognize
the interests of the unborn potential beneficiaries.
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following the rules set forth in the treatises, the Fortune court concluded that
premature termination was appropriate although the unborn beneficiaries had
no opportunity to consent. The court also ignored black letter law in concluding
that Dale, a remainderman with no present right to receive principal from the
trust, should recover individual damages. The majority cited a number of cases
in support of its conclusion that a remedy of damages to the individual benefici-
ary is appropriate. These cases, however, differ factually from Fortune such that
they do not constitute adequate authority for its holding.
Ingle v. Allen 61 is the principal case cited by the North Carolina Supreme
Court in support of its conclusion that Dale should recover individually for
damages caused by First Union's breach of fiduciary duty. In Ingle the court
awarded the plaintiff, Mrs. Ingle, monetary damages for a breach of fiduciary
duty by the trustee named in Mr. Ingle's will. The will gave Mrs. Ingle a life
estate in the parsonage where she lived and required the trustees to pay for re-
pairs on the parsonage and to pay Mrs. Ingle $125 per month from the trust
income or from principal if necessary. The trust never was funded, and the
trustees made no payments to Mrs. Ingle for eight years after her husband's
death. The trustees consequently owed the plaintiff for the monthly $125 pay-
ments that were past due and for substantial repairs that the parsonage needed
due to the trustees' failure to provide maintenance. The court awarded individ-
ual damages. The damages awarded, however, represented a sum certain already
owed to her by the trustees. 62 This case clearly differs substantially from For-
tune, in which the trustee did not yet owe a definite sum. Providing an individ-
ual damages remedy in Ingle is entirely consistent with the principles expressed
in the Restatement, as is providing only the equitable remedy of recovery to the
trust in Fortune.63 The Restatement allows recovery of damages for a sum cer-
tain already owed, but provides only an equitable remedy when there are still
contingent interests and uncertainty regarding amounts of those interests. 64
61. 69 N.C. App. 192, 317 S.E.2d 1, disc. rev. denied, 311 N.C. 757, 321 S.E.2d 135 (1984).
62. Id. at 194-95, 317 S.E.2d at 2.
63. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 198 (1959).
64. Id.; see also Work v. County Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 4 Cal. 2d 532, 51 P.2d 90 (1935)
(cited by the Fortune court in support of its holding; however, like Ingle, the court awarded damages
to a beneficiary for a breach of trust when money was currently and absolutely owed to the benefici-
ary).
The Fortune court also cited First City National Bank v. Haynes, 614 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1981), in support of its holding. Like Ingle, Haynes is not on point with the facts in Fortune.
In Haynes the court awarded actual damages directly to the beneficiaries for the trustee's misman-
agement of trust property. Id. at 607-08. The Haynes court, however, did not clearly state the facts
or clarify the basis of the trustee's duty to pay funds to the beneficiaries. The court gave no indica-
tion that the remedy was not based on a sum certain already owed to the beneficiaries. The key
question in Haynes was whether the beneficiaries could recover punitive damages for the trustee's
breach of trust. Holding that the evidence did not support an award of punitive damages, the court
nevertheless indicated that punitive damages might be awarded for breach of trust when the trustee
intentionally acted with malice or heedless disregard for the rights of the beneficiaries. Id. at 609; see
also Hoppe v. Hoppe, 370 So. 2d 374, 376 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), cert. denied, 379 So. 2d 206
(Fla. 1979) (denying punitive damages but indicating that they might be awarded when the facts
demonstrate the trustee's malicious intent to harm the trust or its beneficiaries). There was no alle-
gation in Fortune, however, that Dale's individual damages were punitive damages.
The majority in Fortune also cited Hoppe v. Hoppe for support of its holding that a beneficiary
may maintain an action at law against a negligent trustee when money is not immediately due to the
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Surprisingly, neither the court nor the parties in their briefs in Fortune cited
Fisher v. Ladd,65 a North Carolina case that perhaps provides the most support
for the Fortune holding. In Fisher the life beneficiary and contingent remainder-
men of a trust sought premature termination of a testamentary trust. The trust
provided for a life estate for the testator's wife and a remainder to be divided
equally among his children, with the issue of any child who predeceased the life
tenant taking their parent's share.66 The widow and adult children of the testa-
tor entered a family settlement agreement and sought distribution of the trust
assets. Guardians ad litem were appointed to represent the interests of the mi-
nor and unborn beneficiaries. 67 The guardians, on behalf of the contingent bene-
ficiaries they represented, refused to consent to termination.68 In accordance
with the general rule, they argued that the trust should not be terminated be-
cause all parties with interests in the trust had not consented. 69 The North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals concluded that the children all had vested interests
determined in amount at the testator's death and that no other interests existed
under the trust despite the contingent interest created in the issue of any of the
testator's children who predeceased the life tenant.70 The Fisher court illogically
ignored the executory interests clearly created by the trust instrument, and up-
held the termination of the trust. 71 The court's failure to cite Fisher indicates
that perhaps the North Carolina Supreme Court did not identify its remedy in
Fortune as actually a premature termination of the trust without the consent of
all the beneficiaries. Fisher provides precedent for premature termination in the
same fact situation, but does so using logic different from Fortune.
Thus, the cases cited by the Fortune court offer scant support for its deci-
sion to award damages directly to Dale.72 The court failed to cite any precedent
awarding damages to a beneficiary before money was due to him. Indeed, most
of the cases cited in Fortune involved a claim for a sum certain owed to the
beneficiary and already past due. These cases differ fundamentally from For-
tune. The trustee in Fortune had no absolute duty to pay any money to Dale
until his mother's death, an event that had not yet occurred. In addition, it was
not yet certain that Dale ever would receive any money, because his issue would
be entitled to the remainder if he did not survive his mother. The court did not
make any effort to harmonize its decision with the Restatement view.
beneficiary. Fortune, 323 N.C. at 149, 371 S.E.2d at 485 (citing Hoppe, 370 So. 2d at 374. In Hoppe,
however, the court only briefly stated that the beneficiary's complaint alleged sufficient facts such
that, if proved, the trustee would be liable. Hoppe, 370 So. 2d at 375-76. The Hoppe court did not
indicate whether a subsequent judgment would be payable directly to the beneficiary or into the
trust. See id.
65. 47 N.C. App. 587, 268 S.E.2d 20 (1980).
66. Id. at 590, 268 S.E.2d at 22.
67. Id. A court typically will appoint a guardian ad litem to represent the interests of minor or
unborn beneficiaries before making a decision regarding distribution of trust assets that may affect
the interests of those beneficiaries.- 4 ScoTr, supra note 1, § 340.
68. Fisher, 47 N.C. App. at 590, 268 S.E.2d at 22.
69. Id. at 591, 268 S.E.2d at 23.
70. Id. at 592, 268 S.E.2d at 23.
71. Id. at 593, 268 S.E.2d at 24.
72. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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The cases that do provide for premature termination of trusts with contin-
gent interests or allowing damage awards to individual beneficiaries when money
is not yet due rely on inadequate theoretical reasoning for their holdings.73 A
large body of case law indicates that it is incorrect to terminate a trust prema-
turely if there are contingent future interests, and commentary uniformly sup-
ports that view. 74 The Restatement approach of providing for distribution of
trust funds only when they are currently due to a beneficiary and maintaining
the trust for all contingent beneficiaries is the theoretically correct approach, for
the Fortune approach terminates the interests of trust beneficiaries who are not
parties to the law suit.
The Fortune court sought to justify its holding with an argument that
Dale's interest in the trust could be determined without undue speculation.
Considering the trustee's discretionary power to distribute to Dale or Mrs. For-
tune and the contingent interest in Dale's issue, the dissenting opinion was prob-
ably more correct in concluding that damages to Dale were much too
speculative. A number of North Carolina cases support the contention that a
plaintiff should not recover damages when the harm he has suffered is highly
uncertain. 75 The issue of the uncertainty of Dale's damages, however, is secon-
dary to the issue of whether Dale or the trust is the proper party to recover
damages. It was the trust that was damaged by the executor First Union, and it
is logical that the trust should be the proper party to recover.
Although Fortune clearly deviated from the more established and logical
line of precedent that a court should not distribute individual damages to a bene-
ficiary unless money is currently due to him and that a court should not termi-
nate a trust prematurely without the consent of all potential beneficiaries, 76 the
court never acknowledged that it was doing so. The court made virtually no
attempt to provide. reasoning for its decision that awarding individual damages
to Dale was appropriate. 77 Indeed, the Fortune majority seems to have failed
entirely to understand or even acknowledge the significant body of law prohibit-
ing premature termination of a trust and distribution to a contingent beneficiary,
despite the strong dissent by justices who apparently understood the majority
rule and offered the legally correct solution.
The facts and circumstances, however, provide reasons for the court's hold-
ing. One probable reason for the court's failure to recognize the appropriate
remedy was the lack of any real advocate for protection of the trust resulting
73. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
74. See supra notes 38-59 and accompanying text.
75. E.g., Phillips v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 43 N.C. App. 56, 257 S.E.2d 671 (1979)
(all damages must be proven with sufficient certainty); see also Brown v. Guthery, 190 N.C. 822, 130
S.E. 836 (1925) (illustrating difficulty of calculating damages for a contingent interest in a trust),
76. The plaintiffs could not have obtained the consent of all the parties because no guardian ad
litem ever was appointed to represent the interests of Dale's unborn children who were contingent
beneficiaries. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
77. See Fortune, 323 N.C. at 149, 371 S.E.2d at 485. The court cursorily concluded that indi-
vidual damages for Dale were appropriate, and the only support for this view was a string citation of
the inapplicable and weakly reasoned cases discussed supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
Fortune, 323 N.C. at 149, 371 S.E.2d at 485.
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from the trial court's failure to appoint a guardian ad litem.78 Because the only
parties having a real interest in preserving the trust were not joined in the action,
it was predictable that the court would receive a distorted picture of the law.
Mrs. Fortune's acquiescence to the distribution of the entire principal to Dale
indicates that the living beneficiaries preferred to receive the principal immedi-
ately. Although early in the litigation First Union argued unsuccessfully that
Dale was not appropriate party to receive damages, First Union had little incen-
tive to pursue that argument because it would pay the same amount whether
directly to Dale or to a new trustee.
Other facts in Fortune undoubtedly contributed to the court's distorted ap-
plication of the law. Dale Fortune made a very sympathetic plaintiff. The
young boy apparently had lived comfortably for the first ten years of his life.
His father ran a successful car dealership lucrative enough to provide the family
with luxuries such as a condominium at the beach.79 After his father's unex-
pected death, Dale was stripped of his substantial inheritance by the negligence
of his father's trustee and at the time of trial was suffering financial hardship. 80
The court's sympathy for Dale is not surprising, nor is its willingness to stretch
the law to find a remedy that would not risk the same damage to his inheritance
at the hands of a new trustee. Though his father's intent in creating the trust
was undoubtedly to ensure long-term security for his family by having a trustee
distribute their inheritance over time, the creation of the trust under his chosen
trustee had quite the opposite effect. It is reasonable to assume that, if Robert
Fortune had foreseen First Union's handling of his estate, he would not have
chosen to create a trust. Furthermore, if he could now choose a remedy for
Dale, in all likelihood, he would prefer that Dale receive his inheritance directly
to avoid risk of further damages.
An award to the trust would have raised new questions and complications
regarding appointment of a new trustee. Perhaps the court wished to save Dale's
inheritance from additional legal costs. Furthermore, the undesirable possibility
existed that a new trustee might be equally delinquent in its duties. Facing this
sort of dilemma, courts sometimes tend to mold the law to create a just remedy.
Difficult cases often produce bad law. Fortune v. First Union is a prime example
of difficult facts leading the court to twist the law for a result that seems just for
a plaintiff in a sympathetic situation.
The result in Fortune, however, creates unfortunate precedent for the pre-
mature termination of trusts. It gives the self-interested contingent beneficiary
grounds to argue for premature termination of a trust, so that he immediately
can get funds that, under the terms of the trust, might never have been his.
Furthermore, a possible complication exists if the unborn and unrepresented
beneficiaries later seek their share.8 1
78. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
79. Plaintiff-Appellee's Brief at 7.
80. Id. at 8.
81. In the event Dale predeceased his mother leaving issue, those issue might then sue to re-
cover the loss to the trust that was now owed to them. The earlier action would not bind the issue
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Because of this possible result, the rule that a beneficiary with no immediate
and unconditional right to distribution can compel only an equitable action to
have the trustee restore money to the trust is rational. In addition, the rule is
reasonable because, almost always, a beneficiary with no immediate and uncon-
ditional right to trust proceeds cannot establish the fair amount of damages with
the requisite specificity. Furthermore, if the trust provides for other interests,
distribution of damages to one beneficiary is fundamentally unfair to the other
beneficiaries who would stand to benefit from that money if the trust were
restored.
Failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for Dale's issue was a very significant
oversight. Potential recipients of the entire trust principal were deprived of any
representation in this case and consequently deprived of their interest in the
trust. The dissenting opinion in Fortune proposed the correct alternative ac-
cording to the basic treatises on trust law. The remedy calls for the appointment
of a substitute trustee and restoration to the trust of the funds lost by the breach
of fiduciary duty. Such a solution does the most to further the testator's intent
for distribution of his estate, and, in general, the testator's intent as expressed in
the trust instrument should be an important consideration. Appointment of a
new trustee would have avoided restoring the money to the hands of First
Union, whose negligence caused the loss. Thus, the Fortune court ignored a
remedy based on a well-established rule of law that would have avoided restor-
ing the funds to the hands of First Union but would have approximated the
wishes of Robert Fortune.
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because they were not joined in that action. In such a situation the court might extend the reasoning
in Fortune to provide them with an actuarially determined share similar to its distribution to Dale.
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